Revolving Door Regulators

Senator yesterday. Lobbyist today.

Representative yesterday. CEO today.

Cabinet level appointee yesterday. Bank Chairperson today.

Government Agency Director yesterday. Law firm senior partner today.

CFPB Regulator yesterday. Competitor today.

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IN THIS ARTICLE

The Inside-Outside Gambit

The Four Horsemen

A Business Model for Former Regulators

Partners in Business

Making a Market in Non-QM

Timeline

What did they know, and when did they know it?

Extinguishing the Fire

Library

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The Inside-Outside Gambit

There are many forms of corruption. Perhaps the most pernicious is where an elected or duly appointed representative of the citizenry leaves office to use the sloughed off position for financial gain in the private sector.

Let's set up a definition for such (mostly unregulated) behavior. I will give it a phrase: "inside-outside gambits."

What is an inside-outside gambit? It is the use of information obtained in the course of a former governmental position by an official for financial gain, directly or indirectly, soon or immediately after leaving government employment in that position. Such information includes contacts with decision-makers in the government; providing information about proprietary conversations leading up to the promulgating of laws, rules, and regulations; access to insiders and knowledge of their views; navigating the systemic and organizational structure; non-public facts regarding the governmental plans or condition that could provide a financial advantage. Note that I use the phrase "inside-outside," not "insider trading."

I am not talking about a situation where there is the illegal trading of a public company's stock or other securities (such as bonds or stock options) by individuals with access to non-public information about the subject company (such trading being illegal).

However, the effect of “inside-outside gambit” and “insider trading” is practically the same: these strategies lead to an unfair, usually economic, advantage.

A basic concept of law is that an injury must be sustained by a plaintiff. Broadly speaking, no injury, no case.

So who is harmed when an equity trader uses inside information for personal financial benefit? The public, of course. Certainly, that part of the public that invests in the stock market, relying on rules, regulations, and laws to be impartially applied, with equal access to all. And who is harmed when a former government official uses inside information for personal financial benefit almost immediately after being employed in the government position. Of course, the public. Certainly, that part of the public that relies on rules, regulations, and laws to be impartially applied, with equal access to all.

How about when regulators in the most powerful agency that regulates the origination of residential mortgage loans, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), leave that agency and start a mortgage company soon after leaving the CFPB, to compete or partner with mortgage companies?

When Thomas Jefferson advocated that legislators should have term limits in order to prompt the return to private life in order to live under the rules they promulgated, somehow I don't think this is what he had in mind.

In a letter of 1776, Jefferson wrote:

[His] "reason for fixing them [elected representatives] in office for a term of years rather than for life was that they might have an idea that they were at a certain period to return into the mass of the people and become the governed instead of the governor, which might still keep alive that regard to the public good that otherwise they might perhaps be induced by their independence to forget."

In other words, Jefferson viewed public service as a privilege. He fully expected government officials to return to private life and live under the laws they passed. I quite doubt that he viewed such a return to be a means for an ex-official’s self-enrichment, by utilizing public service to exploit – or even appear to exploit - the very laws promulgated by the ex-official.

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The Four Horsemen

On July 31, 2013, the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the House Committee on Financial Services sent an eight page Congressional letter (Letter) to Richard Cordray, the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). Signed by a bi-partisan group of Representatives, it expressed concern about the recent departure from the CFPB of four high level officials. The Letter forms the basis of further inquiries by the Committees. Noting a news report, the Representatives indicated it appears that certain officials "have left the CFPB in order to profit from rules they helped create."

Who are these individuals? What were their former CFPB positions?

First, there is Raj Date, former Deputy Director of the CFPB, who left the CFPB on January 31, 2013, shortly after a whole set of Final Rules were issued. (Of course, he gave the unimaginatively standard reason: to spend more time with this family.) Yet a month and a half later he incorporated an "advisory and investment firm,"Fenway Summer LLC" (Fenway), which focuses "on those borrowers who do not meet the standards for 'qualified mortgages' as set by the CFPB under rules." If you would like to know more about this new firm, you can visit its website at http://www.fenwaysummer.com. (Website)

Loan Originator Compensation: Past is Prologue - Part I

In the economic sphere an act, a habit, an institution, a law
produces not only one effect, but a series of effects.
Of these effects, the first alone is immediate;
it appears simultaneously with its cause; it is seen.
The other effects emerge only subsequently; they are not seen;
we are fortunate if we foresee them.
What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen[i]
Frédéric Bastiat

Since April 6, 2011, mortgage loan originators (MLOs) have struggled to comply with the many requirements imposed on them by the MLO compensation provisions of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA),[ii] as amended by Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). That date was the compliance effective date.[iii] Prior to that date, however, there were considerable and persistent efforts made to postpone its implementation.

I tracked the burgeoning protests and litigation in a series of articles[iv] and newsletters.[v] Associations resisted these TILA revisions on behalf of their membership. The National Association of Mortgage Brokers (NAMB) and the National Association of Independent Housing Professionals (NAIHP) sued the Federal Reserve Board of Governors (FRB). Amicus briefs were filed. Many members of Congress, from both sides of the aisle, also protested aspects of the new MLO compensation requirements. All for naught!*

April 6, 2011 arrived. Resistance was futile!

The FRB had issued final rulemaking and official staff commentary with respect to the loan originator compensation rules and anti-steering provisions, but further guidance came to a virtual full stop on January 26, 2011, when the FRB issued its Compliance Guide for Small Entities on Loan Originator Compensation and Steering.[vi] After that, the FRB offered some conference calls, a webinar – which ostensibly cleared up some confusion, while causing other confusion – and provided occasional updates of the oral, rather than the written, official variety.

In the meantime, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) received its “enumerated authorities” on July 21, 2011. From that date forward, the CFPB was in charge of promulgating and administering these compensation guidelines.

And on October 6, 2011 - exactly six months to the day when the rule became effective - the first examination guidelines for loan originator compensation were promulgated.[vii] In the State Nondepository Examiner Guidelines for Regulation Z - Loan Originator Compensation Rule, issued by the Multi-State Mortgage Committee (MMC),[viii] we were given a pretty good idea of the direction that federal and state regulators would be taking in their regulatory examinations for loan originator compensation.[ix]

For the most part, my firm’s clients were prepared for implementation of the compensation rule, but we spent hundreds of hours preparing them for it, consisting of many conferences and meetings, which included very comprehensive reviews of employment agreements, compensation plans, disclosures, policies and procedures, and many other details, both logistical and systemic.

Inevitably, I felt mortgage loan originators needed more information than was readily available. So, we consolidated our knowledgebase and offered the FAQs Outline - Loan Originator Compensation, a compendium of questions and answers about the MLO compensation requirements, first published on March 21, 2011 with 142 FAQs and 35 pages. About a year later, after 20 updates, the FAQs Outline was up to 450 FAQs and 147 pages![x]

In this article, the first in a two-part series, I will consider the recent CFPB proposal, issued on August 17, 2012, which contains certain proposed rules governing mortgage loan originations, especially relating to the MLO compensation guidelines in Regulation Z, the implementing regulation of TILA. Comments for this proposal are due by October 16, 2012.[xi]

In the second part of this series, I will explore these proposals in considerable depth, specifically their clarification of and expansion on existing regulations governing MLO compensation and qualifications.

The CFPB does plan to implement new laws, including a restriction on the payment of upfront discount points, origination points, and fees on most mortgage loan transactions. For this reason, I will conclude this article with a brief, generic outline of certain proposals. To some extent, these new proposals exemplify the hurly-burly, roller-coaster ride we’ve been jaunting about on, in the on-going, elusive quest to implement the MLO compensation rule.

Small Business Review Panel

There is only one difference between a bad economist and a good one:
the bad economist confines himself to the visible effect;
the good economist takes into account both the effect that can be seen
and those effects that must be foreseen.
What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen[xii]
Frédéric Bastiat

The CFPB is required to certify that a proposed rule will not have a significant, adverse, economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.[xiii] The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) provides the basis for a review, inasmuch as, among other things, “small businesses bear a disproportionate share of regulatory costs and burdens.”[xiv] In order to comply with this requirement, the CFPB convened and chaired a Small Business Review Panel to consider the impact of the proposal and obtain feedback from representatives of the small entities that would be subject to the rule. When preparing the proposed rule and an initial regulatory flexibility analysis, the CFPB is expected to consider this panel’s findings.

The panel consisted of representatives from the CFPB, the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration (SBA), and the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).[xv] On the panel were so-called small entity representatives (SERs), individuals who represent the business entities that would be subject to the CFPB’s proposal.[xvi] On July 11, 2012, the panel issued its report.[xvii]

Here are certain, salient topics that were reviewed by the panel:

• Payment of Discount Points
• Payment of Origination Points and Fees in Creditor-Paid Compensation
• Payment of Origination Points and Fees in Brokerage-Paid Compensation
• MLO Retirement Plans, Profit-Sharing, and Bonuses
• Pricing Concessions and Point Banks
• MLO Qualification and Training Requirements

Let us now consider the panel’s suggestions, concerns, resolutions, and recommendations.